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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
INTOXICATION TESTS
In the case of Spencer v. State,' the accused was stopped by the po-
lice while driving a car on the streets of Oklahoma City. He was taken to
the police station where he was charged with driving -while intoxicated.
After being jailed, the accused was taken to a room where he was re-
quested to perform certain acts under the direction of the police. He was
first directed to place his finger to his nose while his eyes were dosed
and his head was back. The officer giving him the test testified that the
accused was uncooperative. Next the accused was directed to walk a line
The officer showed him how he was too walk, heel and toe. These coordi-
nation tests are called the Alcoholic Influence Test.
While he was performing these tests, a movie camera set in the
corner of the room took pictures of the accused without his knowledge or
consent, and without him being advised of his right against compulsory
self-incrimination. The moving pictures were introduced in evidence and
shown to the jury in the trial court. This was objected to by the defense
as a violation of the accused's right against self-incrimination under the
federal and state constitutions. The objection was overruled and the ac-
cused was convicted. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the introduction of the film violated the ac-
cused's right against compulsory self-incrimination under the Oklahoma
Constitution. The court further held that no waiver of the accused's right
took place because: (1) he did not of his own volition freely pose for the
pictures; (2) he was not advised that the tests he performed were op-
tional; (3) he was not advised of his rights concerning the tests.
Tracing the origin of the concept "that no man shall be compelled to
incriminate himself"2 would involve a lengthy historical survey. The con-
cept as we know it got its start as a rule of law during the period of the
great struggle between the common law and the ecclesiastical courts3 The
right against compulsory self-incrimination came to us through our Eng-
lish heritage and has constitutional sanction in the United States4
The law regarding the extent of the right is not dearly defined. A
majority of state courts apply the right against self-incrimination only to
testimonial evidence and not to physical demonstrations or moving pic-
tures of tests.5 Under the majority rule even a compulsory examination is
admissible in evidence as long as the defendant is not compelled to answer
questions about the examination. The Oklahoma Constitution is broader
in scope and includes all evidence involuntarily given.6
The cases in Oklahoma concerning the results of intoxication tests,
where the constitutional question of self-incrimination has been raised, are
1 404 P. 2d 46 (Okla. Cr. App. 1965).
2 8 WIGMORa, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3d. ed. 1940).
a 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 n. 47 (3d ed. 1940).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 Skidmore v. State, 59 Nev. 320, 92 P.2d 979 (1939); State v. Grayson,
239 N.C. 453, 80 SXE.2d 387 (1954).6 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 21.
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few and most are recent.7 The latest decision was in September, 1965.8 It
concerned the taking of a blood sample from the accused while the ac-
cused was unconscious. The court held the admission of the results of the
blood test for alcohol to be in violation of the accused's right against self-
incrimination.The Oklahoma Court has been consistent in the interpretation of the
state constitutional provis~on against compulsory self-incrimination. In the
Spencer case the court cites Apodaca v. State9 as controlling on the ques-
tion of the extent of the right against compulsory self-incrimination. In
the Apodaca case the accused was compelled to submit to a urinalysis to
determine alcoholic influence. In ruling that the results of the test were
inadmissable, the Texas court said: "[TJhe demonstration by an act which
tends to self-incrimination is as obnoxious to the immunity guaranteed by
the Constitution as one by words. '10
The element of compulsion is the crux of the concept. Oklahoma ad-
heres to the view that individual rights should be construed liberally to
prevent compulsory self-incrimination." Several other jurisdictions hold
the same as Oklahoma on the consent to giving evidence. They hold that
consent must be clearly given by the accused with full knowledge of his
rights and fall knowledge of the nature of the test. The mere failure to
object to the test or demonstration in those states does not amount to a
waiver of the accused's constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation.12 This is the same rationale as that of the Spencer case. The ac-
cused never objected to performing the tests; but this did not amount to
consent because he was not informed enough about the transaction taking
place so that he could make a decision.
The compulsion involved need not be actual physical violence or
threats; the presence of a police officer being sufficient. When the ac-
cused does not freely enter into such examinations or tests, but does so
under fear engendered by the police, sufficient compulsion is present.18
"Compulsion is the keynote of the prohibition and to render evidence in-
admissible on the grounds that the defendant was compelled to produce
it against himself, it must appear that such compulsion was used to rob
the accused of his volition in the matter."14 The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in the Spencer case cites a Georgia case and an Alabama case on the
question of compulsion.' 5 In both those cases the accused was charged
7 Hinkefent v. State, 267 P.2d 617 (Okla. Cr. App. 1954); Logan v. State,
269 P.2d 380 (Okla. Cr. App. 1954); Alexander v. State, 305 P.2d 572 (Okla.
Cr. App. 1956); Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okla. Cr. App. 1964).
8 Lorenz v. State, 406 P.2d 278 (Okla. Cr. App. 1965).
9 140 Tex Cr. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1941).
10 Id. at 383.
11 Kuhn v. State, 70 Okla. Cr. 119, 104 P.2d 1010 (1940).
12 Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10 S.W.2d 370 (1928); State v. Newconmb,
220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909); People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W.
309 (1928); State v. Coleman, 96 W.Va. 544, 123 S.F. 580 (1924).13 Alexander v. State, supra note 7.
14 16 C. J. Criminal Law § 1097 (1918).15 Allbright v. State, 92 Ga. App. 251, 88 S.B.2d 468 (1955); Bates v.
State, 40 Ala. App. 549, 117 So.2d 258 (1959).
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